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Abstract—This paper focuses on the coordination of a popula-
tion of thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs) with unknown
parameters to achieve group objectives. The problem involves
designing the device bidding and market clearing strategies
to motivate self-interested users to realize efficient energy
allocation subject to a peak energy constraint. This coordination
problem is formulated as a mechanism design problem, and we
propose a mechanism to implement the social choice function
in dominant strategy equilibrium. The proposed mechanism
consists of a novel bidding and clearing strategy that incorpo-
rates the internal dynamics of TCLs in the market mechanism
design, and we show it can realize the team optimal solution. A
learning scheme is proposed to address the unknown load model
parameters. Numerical simulations are performed to validate
the effectiveness of the proposed coordination framework.
Index Terms—Mechanism design, demand response, market-
based coordination, thermostatically controlled loads
I. INTRODUCTION
Demand response has attracted considerable research at-
tention in recent years, and is regarded as one of the most
important means to improve the efficiency and reliability
of the future smart grid. A natural way to achieve demand
response is through various pricing schemes, such as Real
Time Pricing (RTP), Time of Use (TOU) and Critical Peak
Pricing (CPP) [1], [2]. Many validation projects [3] have
been carried out to demonstrate the performance of these
pricing schemes in terms of payment reduction, load shifting,
and peak shaving. These price-based methods either directly
pass the wholesale energy price to end-users [2] or design
pricing strategies in heuristic ways [4]. It is thus hard to
achieve predictable and reliable aggregated response, which
is essential in various demand response applications, such as
energy capping, load following, frequency regulation, among
others.
To achieve accurate and reliable load response, aggregated
load control has been extensively studied in the literature.
A simple form of aggregated load control is the direct load
control (DLC), where the aggregator can remotely control the
operations of residential appliances based on the agreement
between customers and the utility company. While traditional
DLC is mainly concerned with peak load management [5],
[6], recent research effort focuses more on the modeling and
control of different kinds of aggregated loads, such as data
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center servers [7], [8], hybrid electrical vehicles [9], [10]
and thermostatically controlled loads [11]–[14], to participate
in various demand response programs. Some of these DLC
methods require fast communications between the aggregator
and individual loads. The communication overhead can be
reduced using advanced state estimation algorithms [15], [16]
that can accurately estimate load state information without
frequently collecting measurements from the loads.
Another important paradigm of aggregated load control is
the market-based coordination. It borrows ideas from eco-
nomics [17] to coordinate a group of self-interested users to
achieve desired aggregated load response [18], [19]. Different
from DLC, the market-based coordination affects the load
response indirectly via an internal price signal. The internal
price can be dramatically different from the wholesale price
due to specific group objectives. For instance, in [20] and
[21], a market-based approach is proposed to efficiently
allocate thermal resources among offices only based on local
information. In [22] and [23], a multi-agent based control
framework is proposed to integrate distributed energy re-
sources for various coordination objectives. A distributed al-
gorithm is developed in [24] and [25] for the utility company
and users to jointly determine optimal prices and demand
schedules via an iterative bidding and clearing process. In
[26], a group of smart buildings are coordinated through an
internal price signal to provide frequency regulation services
to the ancillary market. In addition, the Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory launched the GridWise R© demonstration
project to validate the market-based coordination strategies
for residential loads [27]. The demonstration project in-
volved 112 residential houses in Washington and Oregon, and
showed that the market-based coordination strategies could
reduce the utility demand and congestion at key times.
Although the aggregated dynamics of TCLs may signifi-
cantly affect the performance of the control strategies, many
existing market-based coordination strategies either neglect
this internal dynamics or use a simplified model to character-
ize it. In this paper, we consider the coordination of a group
of TCLs to maximize the social welfare subject to a peak
energy constraint, where the internal dynamics of TCLs are
taking into account. This coordination problem poses several
challenges. First, the user utilities are private information,
making it rather challenging for the coordinator to achieve
group objectives with incomplete information. Second, many
existing works [25], [28] require multiple iterations between
the agents and the coordinator to achieve the optimal social
outcome. The real time implementation of such coordination
algorithms requires considerable communication resources.
Third, a lot of existing literature assumes accurate load
models with known parameters. However, the Gridwise R©
demonstration project [27] suggests this is not always the
case. In practice, the information each user sends to the
coordinator can only depend on local measurements, such as
room temperature and “on/off” state. Therefore, an estimation
scheme is needed for the users to compute their bids only
based on online measurements.
The key contribution of this paper lies in the development
of a market-based coordination framework for residential air
conditioning loads with a systematic consideration of all the
aforementioned challenges. In this paper, we formulate the
coordination problem as a mechanism design problem [17],
[29]. The price-responsive loads are modeled as individual
utility maximizers, while the group objective is encoded in
the social choice function, which is to maximize the social
welfare subject to a peak energy constraint. We propose a
mechanism and show it can implement the social choice
function in dominant strategy equilibrium. Such solution
concept does not require iterative information exchanges
between the coordinator and the individual loads, and can
be implemented with limited communication resources. The
proposed mechanism contains a novel bidding and clearing
strategy that incorporates the internal dynamics of the TCLs
into the market mechanism design, and we show that it can
realize the team optimal solution.
Different from many existing works, the problem is ad-
dressed with a systematic consideration of various practical
factors, such as heterogeneous load dynamics, private in-
formation of individual users, unknown parameters of the
load model, communication resources for the information
exchange, etc. All these factors are brought up based on the
observations in the GridWise R© demonstration project [27].
They are important not only for customer privacy protection
and the end user engagement, but also for the cost-effective
implementation of the real-time control strategies. Once our
framework is properly implemented, it can accurately achieve
the desired load responses, and improve the operational
efficiency of the distribution system in an economically
feasible way.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. A motivating
example based on a real-world demonstration project is
presented in Section II, followed by a problem formulation
in Section III. A mechanism is constructed in Section IV
to implement the optimal energy allocation. A joint state-
parameter estimation framework is presented in Section V,
followed by simulations results in Section VI and some
concluding remarks in Section VII.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
The framework proposed in this paper is largely motivated
by the Pacific Northwest GridWise R© demonstration project
[27], where a 5-minute double-auction market is created to
coordinate a group of TCLs to cap the aggregated peak
energy. Each device is equipped with a smart thermostat
that can measure the room temperature and communicate
with the coordinator. Before each market period, the device
measures its room temperature, Tc, and submits a bid to the
coordinator. The bid should consist of the load power and the
bidding price. Since the rated power of the load is different
from its actual power due to environmental disturbances, in
practice each device is required to bid the measured average
power of the most recent market period during which the load
is on. The bidding price is determined by a bidding curve
shown in Fig. 1, where Pavg is the average clearing price
of certain price history (e.g., 24 hours), σ is the standard
variation of the clearing prices during the given history,
and Tmin, Tdesired and Tmax are user-specified minimum,
desired, and maximum temperature, respectively. We denote
the bidding power and price as Qbid and Pbid, respectively.
In addition, each user can specify energy use preferences
through a smart thermostat interface (see Fig. 2). This user
preference will affect the slope of the bidding curve.
The coordinator collects all the bids and orders the bids in
a decreasing sequence, P 1bid, . . . , PNbid. With the associated
power sequence, Q1bid, . . . , QNbid, a demand curve can be
constructed to map the clearing price to aggregated power.
Fig. 3 illustrates how the demand curve is constructed. This
curve is then used to determine the market clearing price
that respects the feeder capacity constraint: when the total
demand is less than the feeder capacity, the market clearing
price is equal to the base price, Pbase (Fig. 4), which is the
wholesale energy price plus a retail modifier as defined by
the tariff of American Electric Power (AEP) [30]; otherwise
the market price, Pc, is determined by the intersection of the
demand curve and the feeder capacity constraint (Fig. 5).
After the market is cleared, each device receives the
energy price and adjusts its setpoint, Tset, according to a
response curve as shown in Fig. 6. This setpoint modifies
the system dynamics and affects the temperature trace of the
TCL, and therefore affects the bid of each user for the next
market period. Notice that all the bidding and user response
processes are executed by a programmable controller, and
the user only needs to specify his/her preferences via the
thermostat interface. To initialize the market process, the user
needs to specify Tmin, Tmax, Tdesired and K , the device
needs to measure the temperature and the power of the last
“on” cycle, and the coordinator needs to collect all the bids,
estimate the power of the unresponsive loads, Quc, and the
feeder capacity constraint, D.
Apart from the GridWise R© project, a similar demonstra-
tion project is also implemented in AEP, Ohio [31], which
involves more households and more sophisticated market
bidding design. These projects provide insights for the coor-
dination of residential loads from the practical point of view.
However, the bidding and pricing strategies are designed in a
heuristic way, which may result in constraint violations and
market inefficiencies. To address these challenges, there is
a strong need to develop a general coordination framework
that can serve as a theoretical foundation to improve the
performance of the control scheme and help to design other
similar market-based coordination strategies.
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Figure 1. The controller measures its current
temperature Tc and submits a bid Pbid to the
coordinator using this curve.
Figure 2. User interface used in the GridWise R©
demonstration project [27].
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Figure 3. The demand curve based on the user
bids, where P i
bid
is the bidding price sequence in
decreasing order, and Qi
bid
is the power of the
most recent on cycle.
Figure 4. The demand curve constructed based
on all the bids. If the total demand is less than the
feeder capacity constraint, then the clearing price
is equal to the base price.
16
Power 
Price 
௕ܲ௔௦௘ 
௖ܲ௔௣ 
ܳ௨௖ ܳ௟௜௠ 
௖ܲ 
Figure 5. When the total demand is greater than
the feeder power constraint, then the clearing price
is determined by the intersection of demand curve
and feeder capacity constraint.
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Figure 6. The user response to the price. For any
given price, the devices determine the temperature
setpoint according to this curve.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a coordination problem for a group of TCLs,
where the coordinator allocates energy to users to maximize
the social welfare subject to a total energy constraint. Each
device is assumed to be equipped with a smart thermostat that
has two main functions. First, it allows the user to specify
energy use preferences via an interface such as the sliding bar
shown in Fig. 2 to indicate one’s trade-off between comfort
and cost. Second, before each market period it submits a bid
to the coordinator based on user’s preference and local device
measurement, such as power consumption, “on/off” states,
and local temperature. The coordinator collects the user bids,
determines the energy price, and broadcasts the price to all
the devices. Each device will then adjust the temperature
setpoint in response to the energy price to maximize the
individual utility. This will modify the system dynamics and
therefore affect the user bids for the next period. In the
considered scenario, we assume that each user is a price taker,
namely, an individual user’s decision will not significantly
affect the market price. This is a standard assumption when
the market involves a large number of players [17, chap.
12.F], [32], [33].
The rest of this section provides formal mathematical
descriptions of the main components of the proposed frame-
work.
A. User Preferences and Utility
Assume that there are N self-interested users. Each user
needs to determine the temperature setpoint to obtain an
energy allocation that maximizes his individual utility (the
user’s comfort minus the electricity cost). In other words,
each user is confronted with the trade-off between comfort
and electricity cost: when the electricity price is high, the
device will adjust the temperature setpoint to save electricity
cost at the sacrifice of user comfort. Formally, a function
Vi : R→ R can be used to represent the comfort level for
each user with energy allocation ai. Assume that Vi(ai)
is concave, continuously differentiable, Vi(0) = 0 and
V ′i (0) > 0. Let θi(tk) represent the private information
of user i. Denote Emi as the energy consumption for the
ith load if it is “on” during the entire period, which gives
ai ≤ Emi . The individual utility maximization problem can
be formulated as follows:
max
ai
Vi(ai; θi(tk))− Pcai (1)
subject to: 0 ≤ ai ≤ Emi ,
where Pc is the energy price. Let hi : R→ R be the optimal
solution to the optimization problem (1), we have:
hi(Pc; θi(tk)) = argmax
0≤ai≤Emi
Vi(ai; θi(tk))− Pcai. (2)
We assume that hi is continuous and non-increasing with
respect to Pc for each i = 1, . . . , N . Notice that the user can
not directly choose his optimal energy allocation. Instead, he
can only determine the temperature setpoint, which affects
the energy consumption through the load dynamics.
B. Individual Load Dynamics
Let ηi(t) ∈ Rn be the continuous state of the ith load.
Denote qi(t) as the “on/off” state: qi(t) = 0 when the TCL
is off, and qi(t) = 1 when it is on. For both “on” and “off”
states, the thermal dynamics of a TCL system can be typically
modeled as a linear system:
η˙i(t) =
{
Aiηi(t) +B
i
on if qi(t) = 1
Aiηi(t) +B
i
off if qi(t) = 0.
(3)
Many existing works use a first-order linear system to capture
the TCL dynamics [11], [15], [16], where ηi(t) only consists
of the room temperature. Although the first-order model
is adequate for small TCLs such as refrigerators, it is not
appropriate for residential air conditioning systems, which
require a 2-dimensional linear system model incorporating
both air and mass temperature dynamics [12]. Such a second-
order model is typically referred to as the Equivalent Thermal
Parameter (ETP) model [34]. In this paper we focus on
the second-order ETP model, which includes the first-order
model as a special case. Let ϕi = [Ai, Bion, Bioff ]T be the
model parameters. Typical values of these parameters and the
factors that affect these parameters can be found in [12].
The power state of the TCL is typically regulated by a
hysteretic controller based on the control deadband [ui(t)−
δ/2, ui(t) + δ/2], where ui(t) is the temperature setpoint of
the ith TCL and δ is the deadband. Let T ic(t) denote the room
temperature of the ith load. In the cooling mode, the load
is turned off when T ic(t) ≤ ui(t) − δ/2, and it is turned on
when T ic(t) ≥ ui(t)+δ/2, and remains the same power state
otherwise. This hysteretic control policy can be described as:
qi(t
+) =


1 if T ic(t) ≥ ui(t) + δ/2
0 if T ic(t) ≤ ui(t)− δ/2
qi(t) otherwise .
(4)
For notation convenience, we define a hybrid state zi(t) =
[ηi(t), qi(t)]
T
, which consists of both the temperature and
the “on/off” state of the load. Let [tk, tk + T ] be the kth
market period, then the energy consumption of each load
during the kth period depends on the system state and
setpoint control ui(t). In this case, the private information
consists of system state and model parameters. Therefore,
the energy consumption of each load can be represented as
ei(ui(tk), zi(tk), ϕi). This energy consumption function can
be derived by calculating the portion of time that the system
is on over the entire market period (details of this calculation
are presented in Section IV). An example is shown in Fig
7, where a second-order ETP model is used and the initial
room temperature is 72.8◦F. Let θi(tk) = (zi(tk), ϕi) be
the overall private information of load i, then the energy
function can be written as ei(ui(tk), θi(tk)). Notice that the
private information for users is time varying, as it contains
the system state.
After the market is cleared, each user wants to determine
the control action ui(tk) such that the resulting energy
consumption equals the optimal solution to (1). Since the
optimal control depends on the energy price, we can define
a user response function, Λi : R→ R with ui(tk) = Λi(Pc).
Therefore, the optimal energy allocation function hi as
defined in (2) should satisfy the following:
hi(·; θi(tk)) = ei(Λi(·), θi(tk)). (5)
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Figure 7. Energy consumption of the TCL during a market clearing cycle
as a function of the temperature setpoint.
The left-hand side of equation (5) represents the optimal
energy allocation for a given price, while the right-hand side
arises from the physical property of the individual loads,
and indicates that the user can specify the control action
ui to match the actual energy consumption to the optimal
allocation. An example of function hi is shown in Fig. 8,
where the response curve is piecewise linear (as shown in Fig.
1) and the initial room temperature is 72.8◦F. To derive the
function hi(·; θi(tk)), we first determine the control setpoint
based on the market price using the response curve (Fig. 1),
then calculate the corresponding energy consumption based
on the energy function ei(·, θi(tk)). Since the energy function
ei(·, θi(tk)) depends on the system dynamics (3) and the
control policy (4), the load dynamics are incorporated in
function hi through this process.
C. Problem Statement
The coordinator obtains energy from the wholesale market
at a cost denoted as C
(∑N
i=1 ai
)
. We assume that C(·)
is differentiable and convex. The energy is then allocated
to users via a price signal to maximize the social welfare,
which can be defined as
∑N
i=1 Vi(ai; θi(tk))−C(
∑N
i=1 ai).
Therefore, the coordinator’s optimization problem can be
formulated as follows:
max
a1,...,aN
N∑
i=1
Vi(ai; θi(tk))− C
(
N∑
i=1
ai
)
(6)
subject to:


∑N
i=1 ai ≤ D
0 ≤ ai ≤ Emi , ∀i = 1, . . . , N
ai = hi(Pc; θi(tk)), ∀i = 1, . . . , N,
where D is the maximum energy for the aggregated loads.
Without loss of generality, we assume that D ≤ NEmi .
Note that the feeder capacity constraints considered in the
GridWise R© demonstration project can be represented by the
total energy constraint. This is because the feeder capacity
constraint is mainly due to the consideration of the thermal
characteristics of the feeder. The instantaneous power can
exceed the feeder power limit without causing damages to the
grid, as long as the energy over a certain period is effectively
capped to protect the feeder from overheating.
The optimization problem (6) defines a Stackelberg game
[35], where the coordinator first makes control decisions to
maximize the social welfare, then the individual users choose
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Price ($/kWh)
E
n
er
g
y
 C
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
(k
W
h
)
Figure 8. Energy consumption of the TCL during a market clearing cycle
as a function of the energy price.
energy consumption to maximize individual utility based
on the coordinator’s control decisions. In such Stackelberg
games, the upper bound on the social welfare can be typically
characterized by the team optimal solution [35], which is the
optimal solution to the following team problem:
max
a1,...,aN
N∑
i=1
Vi(ai; θi(tk))− C
(
N∑
i=1
ai
)
(7)
subject to:
{∑N
i=1 ai ≤ D
0 ≤ ai ≤ Emi , ∀i = 1, . . . , N,
In the above team problem, the coordinator and the users
cooperatively maximize the social welfare subject to the peak
energy constraint. In general, the team solution results in
a higher social welfare than the solution to (6), since the
coordinator’s optimization problem (6) is more restrictive:
one only needs to find an energy allocation to maximize
the social welfare to solve the team problem, while in the
coordinator’s optimization problem, we also need to find a
price to satisfy the additional constraint in (6). However, such
a clearing price may not always exist for an arbitrarily given
team optimal solution.
Example 1: As an example, consider two users with
V1(a1; θ1(tk)) = a1, V2(a2; θ2(tk)) = 3a2. The energy cost
for the coordinator is C(a1 + a2) = 2a1 + 2a2. The team
problem is to maximize the social welfare subject to an
energy constraint, i.e.:
max
a1,a2
2∑
i=1
Vi(ai; θi(tk))− C(a1 + a2) (8)
subject to:
{
a1 + a2 ≤ 1
0 ≤ ai ≤ 2, for i = 1, 2
The team optimal solution is a1 = 0, a2 = 1. However,
according to (1), given any energy price, ai is either 0 or 2.
Therefore, the coordinator can not find a price to realize the
team optimal solution.
To address this concern, we introduce the concept of
realizable energy allocation:
Definition 1: The energy allocation vector,
a = (a1, . . . , aN ), can be realized by Pc, if
ai = hi(Pc; θi(tk)) for all i = 1, . . . , N .
It is clear that not all the energy allocations can be realized.
In this paper, we have assumed that Vi is concave and
continuously differentiable, and hi is continuous and non-
increasing. We will show in Section V that under these
conditions, there is always a price to realize the team optimal
solution. In other words, the upper bound given by the team
optimal solution is tight. Therefore, the problem of the paper
can be formulated as follows:
Problem 1: Design the bidding and clearing strategy, such
that the cleared price realizes the team optimal solution a∗.
The coordinator’s optimization problem (6) can not be
directly addressed using standard optimization techniques,
since the individual valuations are unknown to the coordi-
nator. For this reason, to achieve the group objectives, the
coordinator needs to design a bidding strategy to collect
information from the individual users, and then determine
the price based on the user bids.
Remark 1: The market design for many traditional assets
is well-understood. For instance, in energy market, generators
can be simply characterized by an output range depending on
its ramp rate during each market period. However, the internal
dynamics of TCLs are more complex and depend more on
the environment, and thus cannot be handled in the same
way. Therefore, an important contribution of this paper is to
incorporate the dynamics of TCLs in the energy market de-
sign. In addition, although this paper only considers the load
dynamics within one market period, it is an important step
towards establishing a fully dynamic version of the problem
where multiple market periods are taken into account.
IV. A MECHANISM DESIGN FRAMEWORK
In this section, we adopt the mechanism design approach
to solve Problem 1. First the problem is formulated as a
mechanism design problem, then a mechanism is constructed
to implement the desired social outcome. In addition, a
realistic bidding strategy with a simplified message space is
proposed to reduce the communication overhead.
A. The Mechanism Design Problem
Mechanism design studies how to aggregate the individual
preferences into a social choice while the individual’s actual
preferences are not publicly observable. In a mechanism
design problem, each user is assumed to selfishly take actions
to maximize the individual utility, while the coordinator
makes the collective choice that achieves various group
objectives. Since the individual utility is unknown to the
coordinator, he can require each user to submit a bid to collect
information. In this case, the key problem for the coordinator
is to align individual objectives with system-level objectives.
In other words, a proper bidding and pricing strategy needs
to be designed, such that when each user selfishly maximizes
the individual utility, the resulting outcome also achieves the
desired group objectives (for example, maximizes the social
welfare). The rest of this subsection introduces basic concepts
in mechanism design.
Let x ∈ X be the outcome of the mechanism that
consists of the energy allocation and the energy price, i.e.,
x = (a1, . . . , aN , Pc). The utility of each user (comfort
minus electricity cost) depends on the outcome. Moreover,
we assume that at time tk, each user can privately observe
his utility, Ui, over different outcomes. In other words, we
can model this by supposing that user i privately observes a
parameter θi that determines his utility. Notice that we drop
the dependence of θi on tk throughout the rest of the paper
for notation convenience. In mechanism design, θi ∈ Θi is
usually referred to as the user i’s type [17, p. 858], where
Θi denotes the set of all the possible types. In our problem,
the user type contains the system state, zi(tk), and the model
parameter, ϕi, in particular:
Ui(x; θi) = Vi(ai; θi)− Pcai, (9)
where θi = [zi(tk), ϕi].
As the user preferences are private, to determine the
optimal energy price, the coordinator also needs to require
each user to submit a bid to reveal some information.
Formally, this can be formulated as a message space M =
M1 × · · · ×MN , where Mi denotes the space of messages
(bids) the ith user can communicate to the coordinator.
The structure of Mi depends on particular applications. For
example, in the demonstration project, each device submits
a price and a quantity, then we have (P ibid, Qibid) ∈ Mi. In
[24] each device submits the slope of the demand curve, βi,
in which case βi ∈Mi. After collecting all the user bids, the
market is cleared with an energy price and a corresponding
energy allocation. The clearing strategy can be represented
by an outcome function, g : M → X , that maps the user
bids to an outcome, x. The message space and the outcome
function together fully characterize the rules governing the
procedure for making the collective choice. This is typically
referred to as a mechanism [17], which can be denoted as
Γ = (M1, . . . ,MN , g(·)).
Each user observes θi privately and determines what to bid
to maximize his utility. This process can be represented by a
bidding strategy mi : Θi →Mi that maps the user type to a
message. There are many solution concepts for a mechanism,
such as Nash equilibrium, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, etc.
Of particular interest to our framework in this paper is the
dominant strategy equilibrium. Denote m−i as the collection
of strategies of all the users other than i, then the dominant
strategy equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Dominant Strategy Equilibrium [17]):
The strategy profile (m∗1(·), . . . ,m∗N (·)) is a
dominant strategy equilibrium of mechanism
Γ = (M1, . . . ,MN , g(·)) if for all i and all θi ∈ Θi,
Ui(g(m
∗
i (θi),m−i), θi) ≥ Ui(g(m
′
i(θi),m−i), θi) for all
m′i(θi) ∈Mi and all m−i ∈M−i.
The equilibrium strategy characterizes the individual’s self-
interested behavior: each user is an individual welfare max-
imizer. However, in the coordinator’s point of view, a more
interesting question is to find the best choice for the overall
social welfare. For this reason, a social choice function
f : Θ → X can be defined to represent the desired social out-
come of the coordinator. More specifically, f(·) determines
what outcome will be chosen by the coordinator when he
knows all the private information. In our problem, f consists
of the optimal price to the optimization problem (6) and the
resulting energy allocation. If we define θ = (θ1, . . . , θN ),
the conflict between the personal interest and social interest
can be captured by the concept of implementation:
Definition 3 (Implementation [17]): A mechanism Γ =
(M1, . . . ,MN , g(·)) implements the social choice func-
tion f(·) in dominant strategies if there exists a
dominant strategy equilibrium m∗(·) of Γ, such that
g(m∗1(θ1), . . . ,m
∗
N (θN )) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
In the above definition, g(m∗1(θ1), . . . ,m∗N (θN )) repre-
sents the resulting outcome of individual maximization, while
f(θ) denotes the desired social outcome. The concept of
implementation characterizes the social choice that can be
realized when all the users take actions to selfishly maxi-
mize the individual utility. To this end, Problem 1 can be
equivalently stated as follows:
Problem 2: Design a mechanism to implement the so-
cial choice function f(·) that maximizes the social wel-
fare subject to a peak energy constraint, i.e., f(θ) =
(h1(P
∗
c ; θi(tk)), . . . , hN (P
∗
c ; θi(tk)), P
∗
c ) and P ∗c is the so-
lution to the optimization problem (6). Furthermore, P ∗c
realizes the team optimal solution.
In the above mechanism design problem, the coordinator
needs to design the message space and the market clearing
rule such that the optimal social welfare can be implemented
when each user selfishly maximizes the individual utility.
In the meanwhile, the peak energy constraint needs to be
respected.
B. Constructing the Mechanism
Let f(θ) = (a∗1, . . . , a∗N , P ∗c ) be the social choice function
that maximizes the social welfare subject to the peak energy
constraint. Specifically, P ∗c is the optimal solution to (6), and
f(θ) satisfies the following condition:
a∗i = hi(P
∗
c ; θi), ∀i = 1, . . . , N. (10)
This subsection constructs a mechanism to implement f(·).
Consider a mechanism Γ∗, where each device is asked
to submit function hi(·; θi). Since we have assumed that
hi(Pc; θi) is continuous and non-increasing with respect to
Pc, the message space is the function space of all non-
increasing and continuous functions. Notice that the user’s
actual bids may deviate from function hi, unless they are
motivated to bid hi. Let bi(·; θi) be a non-increasing and
continuous function that represents the user’s actual bid. The
aggregated demand curve b(·; θ) can be obtained by adding
individual bidding functions, i.e., b(·; θ) =
∑N
i=1 bi(·; θi). In
this mechanism, each user is required to submit a function,
which requires considerable communication resources. This
bidding strategy will be simplified in the next subsection to
reduce the communication overhead.
Here we propose the following outcome function
g(b1, . . . , bN) = (a
∗
1, . . . , a
∗
N , P
∗
c ) to clear the market:

a∗i = bi(P
∗
c ; θi) for all i = 1, . . . , N (11)
P ∗c = max
{
P¯ , P ∗
} (12)
P ∗ = C′
(∑N
i=1
a∗i
)
(13)
b(P¯ , θ) = D, (14)
where C′ represents the derivative of the cost function C(·).
According to (13) and (14), P ∗ is the marginal production
cost of procuring
∑N
i=1 a
∗
i amount of energy, while P¯ is
the energy price at which the aggregated demand is equal
to the maximum allowed amount. Since bi is continuous
and non-increasing, and we have assumed that D ≤ NEmi ,
P¯ exists. Intuitively, the social welfare is maximized when
the market price equals the marginal production cost, i,e,
P ∗c = P
∗
. However, in equation (14), the function b is non-
increasing with respect to price, indicating that any feasible
price that respects the feeder capacity constraint should be
greater than P¯ . Therefore, in the proposed outcome function,
the clearing price equals to P ∗ whenever P ∗ > P¯ , and equals
to P¯ otherwise. When the energy price is determined, the
allocation exactly follows the user bids, i.e., a∗i = bi(Pc; θi).
For illustrating purpose, we construct the following example
to show how to derive the optimal solution from the proposed
clearing strategy.
Example 2: Consider 100 users with Vi = − 12a
2
i + (i −
Pc)ai. Assume that after proper scaling, the maximum en-
ergy consumption for each user is 1. The individual utility
maximization problem can be formulated as follows:
max
ai
−
1
2
a2i + (i − Pc)ai (15)
subject to: 0 ≤ ai ≤ 1
The optimal solution to this problem is:
a∗i =


0 if Pc ≥ i
1 if Pc ≤ i− 1
i− Pc otherwise .
(16)
In addition, let us assume that the real time price is 20, and
the maximum 5-minute energy due to the feeder capacity
constraint is 50, i.e., P ∗ = 20 and D = 50. According to
(16), when Pc = 99, only the 100th user consumes 1 unit
of energy, and the aggregated energy is 1. When Pc = 98,
the 99th and the 100th user consume 1 unit of energy,
respectively, and the corresponding aggregated energy is 2,
and so forth. Therefore, the price that corresponds to the
energy limit is 50, i.e., P¯ = 50. Since P¯ > P ∗, we conclude
that P ∗c = P¯ .
The rest of this subsection discusses some properties of
the proposed mechanism.
Proposition 1: When each user is a price taker, the strat-
egy profile (h1(·; θ1), . . . , hN (·; θN )) is a dominant strategy
equilibrium of the proposed mechanism Γ∗.
This result follows easily from the price taker assumption. Its
proof can be found in the Appendix section. In the proposed
mechanism, the optimal bid of each user does not depend
on the bidding decisions of others. This is a very important
property, since in our particular problem, each user does not
know other user’s preferences or actions. Therefore, if the
bidding decision of one user has to depend on the action of
another, then the equilibrium strategy can not be achieved
unless all the users have accurate predictions on other user’s
action, which may not be a reasonable assumption. In ad-
dition, we also want to comment that Proposition 1 only
holds when there are many users such that the influence of
an individual user on the market price is negligible. In other
cases (such as the oligopolistic market), the mechanism needs
to be designed differently.
Now we can establish the following key property of the
proposed mechanism:
Proposition 2: The proposed mechanism Γ∗ implements
the social choice function f(·). Furthermore, the resulting
market clearing price realizes the team optimal solution.
The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix.
C. Realistic Bidding Strategy
The proposed mechanism provides a general solution to
the coordination problem formulated in this paper. In real-
world applications, directly submitting function hi requires
considerable communication resources, and might impinge
on the customer privacy. Therefore, in this subsection we
explore the structure of function ei(·; θi) and hi(·; θi) to
simplify the message space and reduce the communication
overhead.
In this paper we assume that the TCL consumes a constant
power when it is “on”, and consumes no energy when it
is “off”. For this reason, the energy consumption function
ei(·, θi(tk)) can be derived by calculating the portion of time
that the system is on during the entire market period. For
example, assume that the system is “on” at the end of the
(k−1)th period. When the initial temperature ηi(tk) is given,
the state trajectory of the linear dynamic model (3) can be
derived as ηi(t) = eAitηi(tk) + A−1i (eAit − I)Bon, where
ηi(tk) = [η
(1)
i (tk), η
(2)
i (tk)]
T
, η
(1)
i (tk) = T
i
c(tk) and I is the
identity matrix. When the trajectory hits the boundary of the
control deadband defined in (4), the power state will switch
and the system is off. Therefore, the trajectory of the system
state ηi(t) and the power state qi(t) for the entire period can
be derived, and the portion of time that the system is “on”
can be calculated based on qi(t). In particular, consider a
system in cooling mode. If the load is “on” at the end of the
(k−1)th period, i.e., qi(t−k ) = 1, we have the following (the
case for qi(t−k ) = 0 can be derived similarly):
ei(ui(tk), θi(tk)) =


Emi if ui(tk) ≤ T if(tk) + δ/2
0 if ui(tk) ≥ T ic(tk) + δ/2
Emi × α otherwise ,
where α =
∫ T
0 qi(t)dt =
T ′
T
is the portion of time that the
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Figure 9. The energy response curve hi and its approximation.
system is on, and T ′ satisfies the following:

ηi(tk + T
′) = eAiT
′
ηi(tk) +A
−1
i (e
AiT
′
− I)Bon
η
(1)
i (tk + T
′) = ui(tk)− δ/2
η
(1)
i (tk) = T
i
c(tk).
T if (tk) is the room temperature at tk+T given that the system
is on during the entire period between tk and tk + T , which
satisfies the following:

ηi(tk + T ) = e
AiT ηi(tk) +A
−1
i (e
AiT − I)Bon
η
(1)
i (tk + T ) = T
i
f(tk)
η
(1)
i (tk) = T
i
c(tk).
(17)
T if is defined in (17) to characterize the condition in which
the load is “on” for the entire period and therefore consumes
the maximum energy. Intuitively, if the room temperature
at tk is less than the lower bound of the control deadband
(T ic(tk) ≤ ui(tk)− δ/2), the power state will be “off” until
the room temperature hits the boundary of the deadband. On
the other hand, if ui(tk) ≤ T if(tk)+ δ/2, it indicates that the
load is always “on”, and the room temperature does not hit
the boundary for the entire period.
To simplify the message space, we approximate hi with
a step function as illustrated in Fig. 9, where c1 and c2 are
computed based on the control setpoint and user type. For no-
tation convenience, define c1 = ei(u1, θi) and c2 = ei(u2, θi)
, where u1 and u2 are the temperature control setpoints
corresponding to c1 and c2, respectively. For example, using
the second-order ETP model (3) and control policy (4), u1
and u2 for the ith device can be obtained as:

u1 = T
i
c(tk) + δ/2
u2 = LA
−1
i e
AiT (Aiηi(tk) +B
i
on)− LA
−1
i B
i
on + δ/2
= T if(tk) + δ/2,
(18)
where L = [1, 0], and the power state of the ith TCL is “on”
at t−k .
The step function in Fig. 9 can be fully characterized
by two scalars: P ibid and Qibid, where P ibid is the middle
point of c1 and c2, while Qibid is the power consumption
when the device is on during the market period. In this
case, the message space of each user Mi is reduced from
a function space to a space of R2+, and each bid is of the
form [P ibid, Qibid].
Remark 2: Bidding and pricing can be viewed as informa-
tion exchange between the coordinator and the loads that is
essential for optimal decision making. Many advanced DLC
methods also have communication requirements [9]–[14],
[36] and can also accomplish certain group objectives. Some
DLC strategies may even learn the user responses through
the input/output user behaviors. The main difference of the
proposed market-based approach lies in its emphasis on the
quantitative incorporation of user preferences, the economic
interpretation of user bids and coordination signals, and
the encoding of internal load dynamics and user preference
information into the bids.
V. OUTPUT BASED BIDDING
The proposed bidding strategy in Section IV assumes
the knowledge of ETP model parameters. In practice these
parameters are difficult to derive, and the ETP model used in
the framework may be inaccurate in terms of characterizing
the real energy consumption of the TCLs. To address these
challenges, we present a joint state and parameter estimation
framework, which enables users to compute bidding prices
only based on local measurements.
In the ETP model (3), Ai is a constant, while Bion
and Bioff are time varying, which depend on the outside
temperature and the solar heat gain. Let ζk ∈ R2 be a vector
denoting the outside temperature and the solar heat gain.
We assume that ζk can be measured or estimated. When
we have some rough statistical information about the model
parameters, the system dynamics can be captured with an
uncertain discrete dynamic model with Gaussian noise::{
ηi(tk) = A¯iηi(tk−1) + B¯iζk−1 + C¯i + w
i
k−1
yi(tk) = Lηi(tk) + v
i
k,
(19)
where yi(tk) is the output measurement (air temperature),
L = [1, 0] and we have two linear subsystems depending on
the power state of the load:
C¯i =
{
C¯ion if qi(tk−1) = 1
C¯ioff if qi(tk−1) = 0.
(20)
In this model, the dependence of the load dynamics on
the external signal ζk is made explicit. Therefore, Ai, B¯i,
C¯ion and C¯ion are time invariant unknown parameters. Here
we assume that all the noise terms follow the Gaussian
distributions: 

wik ∼ N (w
i
k | 0,Ωi)
vik ∼ N (v
i
k | 0,Σi)
µi ∼ N (µi | 0,Φi0).
(21)
Let ηi(t1) = mi0 + µi be the initial state (µi is the
noise). Denote σi = [A¯i, B¯i, C¯ion, C¯ioff ,Ωi,Σi,mi0,Φi0] as
the unknown parameter to be estimated. The problem can be
then formulated as estimating σi base on local measurements,
Yi = (T
i
c(t1), . . . , T
i
c(tM )). This can be cast as a joint state-
parameter estimation problem, which can be solved using
the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm [37, chap.
13]. The EM algorithm is a two-stage iterative optimization
technique for finding the maximum likelihood solution for
the unknown parameters. In other words, it finds the optimal
σi that maximizes the likelihood function p(Yi|σi), where
Yi = (yi(t1), . . . , yi(tM )). The EM algorithm starts from
some initial selection for the model parameters, σold. In the
first stage (E-step), we evaluate the posterior distribution of
the state p(Zi|Yi, σold) assuming that all the parameters are
known, where Zi = (ηi(t1), . . . , ηi(tM )). In the second stage
(M-step), the derived posterior distribution is used to find the
updates of σi that maximizes the expectation of the logarithm
of the complete-data likelihood function, which is:
Q(σi, σold) =
∑
Zi
p(Zi|Yi, σold)ln (p(Yi, Zi|σi)) . (22)
After the update for the parameter estimation is derived
in the M step, we assign it to σold and go back to E-
step. This procedure is iterated until the estimation of the
state and parameters converges. The detailed steps of the
proposed estimation algorithm for the ETP model can be
briefly summarized as follows:
1) The E Step: The E step finds the distribution for the
system state ηi(tk) conditioned on the full observation se-
quence, Yi = (yi(t1), . . . , yi(tM )), assuming that the model
parameters are known as σold. This inference problem can
be solved efficiently using the sum-product algorithm [37] in
two steps: first, the distribution of state ηi(tk) conditioned
on a partial observation sequence (yi(t1), . . . , yi(tk)) can
be derived with a Kalman filter; second, the conditional
distribution p(ηi(tk) | Yi) can be found with a Kalman
smoother.
Denote αˆ(ηi(tk)) as the conditional distribution p(ηi(tk) |
yi(t1), . . . , yi(tk)), which satisfies:
αˆ(ηi(tk)) = N (ηi(tk) | µk,Φk), (23)
where N stands for Gaussian distribution with uk and Φk as
its mean and covariance, respectively. In the context of linear-
Gaussian systems, the sum-product algorithm [37] gives the
following recursion equations:


µk = A¯iµk−1 + B¯iζk−1 + C¯i +Kk
(
yi(tk)− LA¯iµk−1
−LB¯iζk−1 − LC¯i
)
Φk = (I −KkL)Pk−1,
(24)
where C¯i = C¯ion if the ith load is “on”, and C¯i = C¯ioff if
otherwise. Pk and the Kalman gain matrix is defined as:{
Pk−1 = A¯iΦk−1A¯
T
i +Ωi
Kk = Pk−1L
T (LPk−1L
T +Σi)
−1.
(25)
The initial conditions for the recursion equation are given by:{
µ1 = m0 +K1(yi(t1)− Lm0)
Φ1 = (I −K1L)Φi0,
(26)
where K1 = Φi0LT (LΦi0LT +Σi)−1.
With the above recursion equations, we can derive the
distribution for ηi(tk) conditioned on the observations from
yi(t1) to yi(tk). Next we turn to the problem of finding
the probability distribution for ηi(tk) given all observations
from yi(t1) to yi(tM ). Denote the conditional distribution
p(ηi(tk) | Yi) as γ(ηi(tk)), which satisfies:
γ(ηi(tk)) = N (ηi(tk) | µˆk, Φˆk). (27)
The sum-product algorithm gives the following recursion
equations:
{
µˆk = µk + Jk(µˆk+1 − A¯iµk − B¯iζk − C¯i)
Φˆk = Φk + Jk(Φˆk+1 − Pk)J
T
k ,
(28)
where Jk = ΦkA¯Ti (Pk)−1.
With the recursion equation presented above, the condi-
tional distribution p(ηi(tk) | Yi) can be computed using
backward induction.
2) The M Step: The M step tries to find the parameter
update that maximizes the logarithm of the complete-data
likelihood function (22). Equation (22) indicates that aside
from the conditional distribution p(ηi(tk) | Yi, θold) (already
obtained in the E step), the likelihood function also depends
on the joint distribution p(Zi, Yi | σi). For the linear-
Gaussian system (19), the logarithm of this joint distribution
p(Zi, Yi | σi) is given by:
ln p(Zi, Yi | σi) =
M∑
k=2
ln p(ηi(tk) | ηi(tk−1), A¯i, B¯i, C¯i,Ωi)
+
M∑
k=1
ln p(yi(tk) | ηi(tk), L,Σi)
+ ln p(ηi(t1) | mi0,Φi0), (29)
where the dependence of the joint distribution on the un-
known model parameters is made explicit. The complete-
data likelihood function Q(σi, σold) can be then obtained by
taking the expectation of (29) over Zi using the posterior
distribution p(ηi(tk) | Yi, θold) derived in the E step.
Let σ′i = (A¯′i, B¯′i, C¯′i,on, C¯′i,off ,Ω′i,Σ′i,m′0,Φ′0) be the
update of the unknown parameter in the M step, i.e.,
σ′i = argmaxσi Q(σi, σold). The explicit formula for each
component of σ′i is given as follows (please refer to [37] for
the detailed derivation):
(i) Maximizing (22) over mi0 and Φ0, the updates can be
derived as:{
m′0 = E[ηi(t1)]
Φ′0 = E[ηi(t1)ηi(t1)
T ]− E[ηi(t1)]E[ηi(t1)T ].
(ii) Maximizing the likelihood function (22) over A¯i, the
update of A¯i is given by:
A¯′i =
( M∑
k=2
E[ηi(tk)ηi(tk−1)
T ]− B¯iζk−1E[ηi(tk−1)
T ]
− C¯iE[ηi(tk−1)
T ]
)
×
( M∑
k=2
E[ηi(tk−1)ηi(tk−1)
T ]
)−1
.
(30)
(iii) Maximizing the likelihood function (22) over B¯i, we
can derive the update of B¯i as follows:
B¯′i =
(
M∑
k=2
(
E[ηi(tk)]− A¯
′
iE[ηi(tk−1)]− C¯i
)
ζTk−1
)
×
(
M∑
k=2
ζk−1ζ
T
k−1
)−1
(31)
(iv) Maximizing the likelihood function (22) over C¯ion and
C¯ioff , the updates are given as:

C¯′i,on =
1
ϑ1
∑
k∈M1
(
E[ηi(tk)]− A¯
′
iE[ηi(tk−1)]− B¯
′
iζk−1
)
C¯′i,off =
1
ϑ2
∑
k∈M2
(
E[ηi(tk)]− A¯
′
iE[ηi(tk−1)]− B¯
′
iζk−1
)
,
(32)
where M1 ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,M} denotes the time instants
when the system is on, and ϑon represents the size of
M1. M2 and ϑ2 are defined similarly.
(v) The update function for Ωi can also be derived by
maximizing the likelihood function with respect to Ωi,
which gives:
Ω′i =
1
M − 1
M∑
k=2
{
A¯′iE[ηi(tk−1)ηi(tk−1)
T ]A¯′Ti
− E[ηi(tk)ηi(tk−1)
T ]A¯′i − A¯
′
iE[ηi(tk−1)ηi(tk)
T ]
+ E[ηi(tk)ηi(tk)
T ]− (B¯′iζk−1 + C¯i
′
)E[ηi(tk)
T ]
− E[ηi(tk)](ζ
T
k−1B¯
′T
i + C¯
′T
i ) + C¯i
′
E[ηi(tk−1)
T ]A¯′Ti
+ B¯′iζk−1E[ηi(tk−1)
T ]A¯′Ti + A¯
′
iE[ηi(tk−1)]ζ
T
k−1B¯
′T
i
+ A¯′iE[ηi(tk−1)]C¯
′T
i + (B¯
′
iζk−1 + C¯
′
i)ζ
T
k−1B¯
′T
i
+ (B¯′iζk−1 + C¯
′
i)C¯
′T
i
}
. (33)
(vi) The update for Σi can also be obtained similarly:
Σ′i =
1
M
M∑
k=1
{yi(tk)yi(tk)
T − LE[ηi(tk)]yi(tk)
T−
yi(tk)E[ηi(tk)
T ]L+ LE[ηi(tk)ηi(tk)
T ]L}.
(34)
In the above update equations, E[ηi(tk)] and
E[ηi(tk)ηi(tk)
T ] can be computed based on the conditional
distribution p(ηi(tk) | Yi) obtained in the E step, while
the pairwise expectation E[ηi(tk)ηi(tk−1)T ] can be derived
using Bayesian Theorem. The expressions for these
expectations are as follows [37]:

E[ηi(tk)] = µˆk
E[ηi(tk)ηi(tk−1)
T ] = Jk−1Φˆk + µˆkµˆk−1
E[ηi(tk)ηi(tk)
T ] = Φˆk + µˆkµˆ
T
k .
(35)
After the update σ′i of the the estimated parameter is derived,
we assign it to σold and go back to the E step. This process
is repeated until the update for the estimated parameters
converges. When the estimation for σi is obtained, each user
can compute the bidding prices based on (18) and the bidding
curve as shown in Fig. 1. The output-based bidding algorithm
is summarized as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The output-based bidding algorithm
Initialization: Initial guess of parameters σold and mea-
surement sequence Yi.
1: while convergence criteria not satisfied do
2: Find the conditional distribution of system state
p(Zi|Yi, σold) using Kalman Filter.
3: Find σi that maximizes the complete-
data likelihood function Q(σi, σold) =∑
Zi
p(Zi|Yi, σold)lnp(Yi, Zi|σi). Denote the optimal
solution as σnew
4: Update the parameter estimation: σold = σnew .
5: end while
Output: The estimation of the state trajectory Zi and the
parameters σi.
VI. CASE STUDIES
This section applies the proposed market mechanism and
the learning scheme to the TCL coordination problem con-
sidered in the GridWise R© demonstration project [27], and
presents simulation results to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed market mechanism.
A. Simulation Setup
Similar to the GridWise R© project, we consider a realistic
scenario where each user is equipped with a smart thermostat
that can measure the room temperature and communicate
to the coordinator. At each period, the device measures the
current room temperature and submits a bidding price based
on a bidding curve. The coordinator collects all the user
bids and clears the energy market with a price. Each device
will then determine the control setpoint in response to this
energy price, which modifies the load dynamics and affects
the bids for the next period. This framework is validated in
Matlab using the parameters generated in GridLab-D [38].
The details of the demonstration project can be found in
Section II.
The second-order ETP model is used to capture the load
dynamics of the TCLs. The ETP model parameters depend
on various building parameters, such as glass type, floor
area, area per floor, glazing layers and material, etc. Detailed
description of these parameters and their relations to the ETP
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Figure 10. Comparison of the actual power trajectory and the cleared power.
The outside air temperature record is on August 20, 2009 in Columbus, OH.
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Figure 11. The demand curve and the market clearing process at 08:20
AM. When the total demand is less than the feeder capacity constraint, the
market price is equal to the base price.
model parameters can be found in [39]. In the simulation,
1000 sets of building parameters are generated. A few
important parameters are randomly generated using the same
approach as in [12], while the rest take their default values
from GridLAB-D. Throughout the simulation, the aggregated
power of the unresponsive loads is assumed to be 12MW ,
and the feeder power capacity is 15MW . In addition, we
refer to the “power” consumption of the load as the average
power during one market period (5 minute), unless otherwise
stated.
We use the weather data and the Typical Meteorological
Year (TMY2) data for Columbus, OH, obtained from [40],
[41], which includes air temperature and solar radiation. The
wholesale energy price is from the PJM market [42]. It is
modified to a retail rate in $/kWh plus a retail modifier as
defined by AEP’s tariff [30], and we define this retail price
as the base price.
B. Results and Analysis
First the proposed mechanism is evaluated in the deter-
ministic case, where each user can accurately estimate the
unknown parameters. Each user submits a bid as described
in Fig. 1, and the market is cleared according to the proposed
outcome function (11)-(14). Air temperature record is on
August 20 (mild day), 2009 in Columbus, OH, and the
aggregated power trajectory is presented in Fig. 10.
It shows that the power trajectory is effectively capped
below the feeder power capacity for the entire day. Notice
that whenever the coordinator clears the market with an
energy price, there is a corresponding power on the ag-
gregated demand curve (as shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5).
We call it the cleared power, which stands for the coor-
dinator’s estimation on the aggregated power consumption
before the market is cleared. Simulation results demonstrate
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Figure 12. The demand curve and the market clearing process at 04:40 PM.
When the total demand exceeds the feeder capacity constraint, the market
price is higher than base price to respect the feeder capacity constraint.
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Figure 13. Comparison of the trajectories of the market clearing price and
wholesale energy price. The price is higher during the congestion, which
effectively caps the peak energy at key times.
that this cleared power accurately matches the actual power
consumption. This enables the coordinator to select proper
prices to effectively achieve the desired aggregated power
consumption. To demonstrate how it works, we randomly
choose two market periods and present their market clearing
procedures in Fig. 11 and Fig. 12, respectively. When there
is no power congestion, the coordinator can directly pass the
base price to individual users. This case is shown in Fig. 11,
which corresponds to 08:20 AM in Fig. 10. When the power
congestion occurs, the coordinator should clear the market
at the intersection of the aggregated demand curve and the
curve of the feeder power constraint. This case is presented
in Fig. 12, which corresponds to 04:40 PM.
The trajectories of the market clearing price and the base
price are shown in Fig. 13. The figure shows that the market
clearing price is equal to the base price when there is
no congestion, and is higher than the base price during
congestion hours. Notice that when C′(α) 6= Pbase, the
market price can be different from base price in uncongested
period as well, where α is the total energy purchased from
the wholesale market. In addition, a few price spikes can be
observed in the simulation result. However, these spikes are
not created by the proposed framework, but instead caused
by the fluctuations of the base price.
Furthermore, to evaluate the proposed mechanism in terms
of social welfare maximization, we compare it with a base
scenario, where Real Time Pricing (RTP) is adopted to cap
the power in a heuristic way. More specifically, when there is
no congestion, the market clearing price is equal to the base
price. When the power congestion occurs, the clearing price
is the base price multiplied by a fixed ratio γ, which is greater
than 1 and can cap the aggregated power below the limit
effectively. We can run simulations to find such ratios, and
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Figure 14. Comparison of the social welfare of the proposed pricing strategy
and the base scenario. The base scenario adopt RTP and multiplies the base
price by a fixed ratio to cap the total energy.
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Figure 15. The estimation result of the output-based bidding algorithm. The
initial guess of the simulation is randomly selected from 90% and 110% of
its true value.
among all the possible ratios, we choose the minimum one
that can cap the aggregated power below the feeder capacity.
Since the social welfare of the two scenarios will be the same
during the uncongestion period (γ = 1), we use the weather
data on August 16, 2009, where more power congestion can
be observed due to the elevated temperature. In this case
γ = 2.6, and the social welfare of the two pricing strategies
is shown in Fig. 14. The simulation results demonstrate that
the proposed optimal pricing strategy always outperforms the
base scenario in terms of social welfare. Notice that in this
paper we run simulations for different values of γ to find the
minimum value that can cap the aggregated power. However,
this ratio is difficult to derive in practice, and therefore a
much more conservative value has to be used to operate the
power grid safely. This will further reduce the social welfare
of the base scenario.
C. The Output-based Bidding Algorithm
This subsection shows how the proposed output-based
bidding algorithm can be used to accurately estimate the
bidding prices. Fig. 18 shows the simulation setups for
the proposed algorithm. In the simulation, the ETP model
parameters are the default values in GridLab-D, which are
generated based on some non-Gaussian distribution, while
the process noises win and the measurement noises vin are
Gaussian. In addition, we assume that each device can locally
measure its room temperature every minute, and store all the
measurements for the past 6 hours, in which case M = 360.
The algorithm is started with an initial guess σold with 10%
error. In other words, each element of the initial guess σold
is generated by randomly selecting a value between 90% and
110% of its true value. With the estimated parameters derived
in the output-based bidding algorithm, each user can compute
the bidding prices based on the realistic bidding strategies
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Figure 16. The actual power trajectory and the cleared power based on the
demand curve with 2% bidding error. The outside air temperature record is
on August 20, 2009 in Columbus, OH.
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Figure 17. The aggregated power and the cleared power under real time
pricing strategy. The base price is directly passed to the retail market.
shown in Fig. 9. Here we choose a random user in a random
market period and present its estimation result in Fig. 15.
In this figure, the estimated bidding price is derived from
the output-based bidding algorithm, while the true bidding
price is computed based on the true value of the unknown
parameters. It can be seen that the estimated bid closely
follows the true value, with an average estimation error less
than 1%.
When all the users apply the output-based bidding al-
gorithm to compute the biding prices, an error (of less
than 1%) will be introduced. Now we evaluate how this
estimation error can affect the aggregated power response.
To implement the estimation framework, each device will
locally perform the output-based bidding algorithm during
each market period, which just takes 5.5 seconds on a laptop
with 2.5GHz Intel i5 processor and 8G memory. However, it
is computationally intensive to do the centralized simulations
for all the users over 24 hours to show how the estimation
error affects the aggregated power response. For this reason,
instead of directly incorporating the output-based bidding
algorithm in individual simulations, we add a simulated error
of 2% (this simulated error is larger than the actual error of
the output-based bidding algorithm) to each user’s bidding
price. The simulation results with this bidding error are
presented in Fig. 16. It can be seen that the aggregated power
is effectively capped below the feeder capacity during 84%
of the time. In the cases where the feeder capacity constraint
is violated, the aggregated power exceeds the power limit
by 1.1% on average, and the maximum violation occurred at
4:15 PM, where the power limit is exceeded by 3.3%. Notice
that these small violations can be easily fixed by adjusting
the feeder capacity constraint in the formulation to be slightly
more conservative.
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Figure 18. Illustration for the out-based bidding algorithm. The ETP model
parameters are default values in GridLAB-D generated according to a non-
Gaussian distribution.
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Figure 19. The market clearing strategy during power congestion under
real time pricing. The market clearing point violates the feeder capacity
constraint.
D. Comparison with Other Strategies
In this subsection we first compare the proposed mecha-
nism with RTP [2]. RTP can incentivize users to shift demand
from high price periods to low price periods to reduce elec-
tricity expenditures. However, as such an approach directly
passes the base price to the retail market, it can not achieve
predictable and reliable aggregated power response, which is
essential in many demand response programs. To illustrate
these limitations, we compare our framework with RTP by
applying RTP in the considered problem. In this simulation
the coordinator clears the market by directly passing the
base price to individual users, and the devices respond to
the energy price according to the response curve described
in Fig. 6. Except for the pricing strategy, all the parameters
are the same as in the simulation in Section III-B, and the
result is presented in Fig. 17. When there is no congestion,
the real time pricing scheme has the same performance as
the proposed mechanism, and efficient energy allocation can
be achieved. However, during the power congestion period,
the RTP method can not prevent the aggregated power from
exceeding the feeder power limit. For instance, the market
clearing process at 4:40 PM is presented in Fig. 19. In
the example, due to the increased power demand in the
afternoon, the market clearing point exceeds the feeder power
limit. This issue can be solved in the proposed mechanism
with an elevated energy price during power congestion. We
emphasize that the proposed mechanism may also fail to cap
the energy in certain extreme case. For instance, when the
outside temperature is extremely high and all the participating
TCLs have very small thermal capacity and resistance, then
it is possible that a large number of users have to turn on the
TCL for the entire market period, and the aggregated energy
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Figure 20. The actual power trajectory and the feeder capacity. The outside
air temperature record is on August 16, 2009 in Columbus, OH.
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Figure 21. The influence index of a randomly chosen user over different
population sizes. The influence of individual bid drops rapidly as the
population size grows.
can not be capped effectively. However, this is not due to
the proposed mechanism, but rather because of the physical
limitation of the system.
In addition, the proposed mechanism is also compared
with the original Gridwise R© demonstration project (base
scenario). In the simulation, the market clearing strategies
of the two cases are the same, while the bidding strategies
are different. In the base scenario, each device submits a bid
based on the current temperature, while the device in the
proposed mechanism computes the bid according to Fig. 9.
Except for the bidding strategy, all the parameters are the
same as in the simulation in Section III-B, and the result
of the base scenario is presented in Fig. 20. In this case,
the user bids only depend on the room temperature, and
the information regarding the model parameter is missing.
Therefore, although the same pricing strategy is applied, the
coordinator still can not achieve the desired aggregated power
response.
E. Impact of Some Key Parameters
This subsection discusses how a few important parameters
can affect the performance of the proposed mechanism.
1) Number of Households: In this paper, we assume that
every user is a price taker: the bid of an individual user
can not affect the market price. Theoretically, this assump-
tion only holds when the market satisfies some regulatory
conditions, such as sufficiently many users, free entry, ho-
mogeneous good, etc [17, Chap. 12]. In this subsection we
use numerical simulations to investigate to what extend this
assumption can be justified. In particular, we simulate the
influence of individual bid on the market price, and explore
how this influence changes with the growing number of
participating households. This can be done by perturbing
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Figure 22. The hourly temperature used in the simulation. The record is
from August 16 (hot day) and August 20 (mild day), 2009 in Columbus,
OH.
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Figure 23. Comparison of the actual power trajectory and the cleared power.
The outside air temperature record is on August 16, 2009 in Columbus, OH.
the bidding price of a user i, and see how the market price
changes with this perturbation while the bids of all the other
users remain the same. It can be verified that under the
proposed clearing strategy, the user bid could only affect
the market price in two possible ways: change the market
price by a fixed value (regardless of how big the perturbation
is) or no influence at all. To quantitatively represent this
market influence, we define an influence index, which is
the maximum market price change (in percentage) that a
user could incur by perturbing its bidding price. When the
individual bid has no influence on the market clearing price,
the influence index is zero, and the price-taker assumption
holds.
The simulation can be done in the following steps. First,
randomly choose a group of users (for example, 100 users)
and a market period, simulate the market bidding and clearing
process, and derive the corresponding market clearing price.
Second, choose one user from this group, perturb his bid, and
rerun the market clearing process to obtain another market
price. Third, compute the influence index based on the market
clearing prices derived from the first two steps. Fourth,
enlarge the group and repeat all the procedures described
above. Notice that when there is no congestion (as illustrated
in Fig. 11), the clearing price is always the base price, and the
influence index is 0. Therefore, all the simulations are done
in a market period during which power congestion occurs.
In addition, to enforce a fair comparison, we assume that the
feeder capacity constraint changes according to the number of
participating household. For example, if the maximum power
of each air conditioning load is 5kW, and there are N loads
in the project, then the maximum aggregated power is 5N
kW, and the feeder power capacity is 60% of the maximum
power, i.e., 3N kW.
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Figure 24. The market prices of the hot day and the mild day. The average
price of the hot day is higher than that of the mild day.
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Figure 25. The estimation result of the output-based bidding algorithm
when the initial guess is randomly selected from 50% and 150% of its true
value.
The simulation result is shown in Fig. 21. It starts with 10
users and the inference index in this case is around 35%. This
influence drops rapidly as the number of the participating
loads increases. When there are more than 200 loads, the
influence index is always less than 1%. When the population
size is larger than 500, the inference index is less than 0.4%,
in which case the influence of individual users on the market
price can be safely neglected.
2) Weather Information: Aside from the number of par-
ticipating households, the outside temperature data is also
an important parameter that affects the performance of the
proposed mechanism. The high temperature period can sig-
nificantly increase the aggregated power demand of the air
conditioning loads, and therefore cause more power conges-
tion. For this reason, we evaluate the proposed method with a
different temperature record. The data is obtained from [40]
on August 16 (hot day), Columbus, OH, as shown in Fig.
22.
The power trajectory and the market clearing prices are
presented in Fig. 23 and Fig. 24, respectively. Since the
elevated temperature increases the power demand, much
more power congestion can be observed during the hot day.
Despite the power congestion, the simulation result shows
that the proposed framework can still effectively cap the
aggregated power below the power limit, and the actual
power accurately matches the planned power.
3) Initial Guess of the output-based bidding algorithm:
The initial guess of the output-based bidding algorithm is
also crucial to performance of the estimation result. In
our previous simulations, the initial guess is generated by
randomly selecting a value between 90% and 110% of
its true value. Therefore, to implement the output-based
bidding algorithm, we need to assume that users have some
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Figure 26. The estimation result of the output-based bidding algorithm
when the process noise and measurement noise are generated based on a
uniform distribution.
prior knowledge of the unknown parameters to guarantee
that initial guess is within this range (from 90% to 110%
of the true value). In this subsection we explore to what
extend we can relax this assumption without compromising
the estimation performance. In particular, we use the same
model parameters as in Section III-C, and test the proposed
algorithm with an error of 50%. The estimation result is
shown in Fig. 25, which shows that the output-based bidding
algorithm can accurately estimate the bidding prices even
with 50% error on the initial guess.
4) Model noises: The proposed EM algorithm is devel-
oped mainly based on the linear Gaussian model (19), where
we assume that Bion and Bioff can be decomposed into
three parts: the external signals, a constant and a Gaussian
process noise. However, we emphasize that in our particular
problem, the process noise does not have to be Gaussian,
and the proposed EM algorithm can be extended to a much
broader class of “real” dynamical systems. To support this
argument, the proposed EM algorithm is tested with non-
Gaussian noises. In particular, in the simulation the process
noises and the measurement noises are generated based on a
uniform distribution, while the rest of the model parameters
are generated the same way as described in Section III-C.
The simulation result is presented in Fig. 26, where the
estimated bidding prices are close to the real bidding prices.
The key reason for this result is that in our problem, the
EM algorithm does not need to accurately estimate all the
unknown parameters (such as A¯i, B¯i and C¯i). Instead, we
only need to estimate the bidding price, which is a scalar-
valued function of these unknown parameters. According to
(18), the bidding price mainly depends on the current room
temperature T ic(tk) and the room temperature 5 minutes after
tk. Since we have measurements of the room temperature for
the past 6 hours in the algorithm, this information is already
contained in these measurements except for the last 5 minutes
of the 6 hour period. Therefore, although the algorithm can
not converge to all the true unknown parameters, it does
converge to the true bidding price under non-Gaussian noise
distributions.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presents a market mechanism for the coordina-
tion of thermostatically controlled loads, where a coordinator
manages a group of TCLs using pricing incentives to maxi-
mize the social welfare subject to a peak energy constraint. In
the paper, a mechanism is proposed to implement the desired
social choice function in dominant strategy equilibrium. This
mechanism consists of a novel bidding strategy that incorpo-
rates information on both the load dynamics and the time-
varying user preferences. It is proven that under the proposed
mechanism, the coordinator can not only maximize the social
welfare but also realize the team optimal solution. Future
work includes formulating the fully dynamic market-based
coordination framework with multiple periods and extending
the results to energy storage devices and deferrable loads
such as plug-in electric vehicles, washers, dryers, among
others.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
When each device submits hi as the bid, we have
bi(·; θi) = hi(·; θi). According to (11), each user will receive
an energy allocation that satisfies a∗i = hi(Pc; θi). Based
on (2), we have: a∗i = argmax0≤ai≤Emi Vi(ai; θi) − Pcai.
Therefore, when bi(·; θi) = hi(·; θi), the resulting energy
allocation maximizes the utility of each user. According to
Definition 2, the strategy profile (h1(·; θ1), . . . , hN (·; θN )) is
a dominant strategy equilibrium of the proposed mechanism.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
Notice that the social choice function characterizes the
optimal solution to the coordinator’s optimization problem
(6), and the team solution provides an upper bound on the
social welfare for (6). Therefore, to prove Proposition 2, it is
sufficient to show that the proposed pricing strategy realizes
the team solution.
Based on Proposition 1, bi = hi. Therefore, we have the
following relations:

a∗i = hi(P
∗
c ; θi), for all i = 1, . . . , N
P ∗c = max
{
P¯ , P ∗
}
P ∗ = C′
(∑N
i=1 a
∗
i
)
∑N
i hi(P¯ , θ) = D.
(36)
In addition, the KKT condition for the ith user’s individual
utility maximization problem (1) is as follows:
− V ′i (a
∗
i ; θi) + P
∗
c + u
i
1 − u
i
2 = 0, (37)
where ui1 and ui2 are the Lagrangian multiplier satisfying:

ui1 ≥ 0, u
i
2 ≥ 0
ui1 = 0 if a∗i 6= Emi
ui2 = 0 if a∗i 6= 0.
(38)
Define u = P ∗c −C′
(∑N
i=1 a
∗
i
)
, then equation (37) becomes:
− V ′i (a
∗
i ; θi) + C
′
(∑N
i=1
a∗i
)
+ u+ ui1 − u
i
2 = 0, (39)
According to (36), when ∑Ni a∗i < D, we have P ∗c = P ∗ =
C′
(∑N
i=1 a
∗
i
)
, therefore, u = 0. When
∑N
i a
∗
i = D, we
have P ∗c = P¯ , and therefore, u = p¯ − p∗. Since hi is non-
increasing, we have u ≥ 0. This indicates that u, ui1 and ui2
are the Lagrangian multipliers of the team problem, and (39)
is exactly the KKT condition for the team problem (7). Since
the team problem is a concave optimization problem, the
KKT conditions are also sufficient. Thus a∗ = (a∗1, . . . , a∗N )
is the team solution. This completes the proof.
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